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circumstances were not proven. Addition-
ally, there was nothing in the trial judge's 
instruction to indicate that the jury had 
the third option advanced by the court of 
appeals; namely, to leave the answer blank 
when a unanimous finding of either "yes" 
or "no" could not be reached and then 
proceed to the balancing phase. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court concluded that it was 
possible that a jury following the trial 
judge's instructions could be precluded 
from considering possible relevant 
mitigating circumstances, "if even a single 
juror adhered to the view that such a fac-
tor should not be so considered." Id. at 
1868. 
Regarding the verdict from itself, the 
Supreme Court found persuasive the fact 
that subsequent to the decision below, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland had found 
it necessary to promulgate a new verdict 
form, which expressly made provisions for 
the jury to find that not all twelve jurors 
agree on the existence or nonexistence of a 
particular mitigating circumstance. This 
new form also expressly makes provisions 
for such findings to be included in the bal-
ancing portion of the sentencing. The 
Court also noted that in the two cases tried 
before juries which used the new verdict 
form, both juries reported non-unanimous 
votes. 
Consequently, the Court found 
that there is a substantial possibility 
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving 
the judge's instructions in this case, 
and in attempting to complete the ver-
dict form as instructed, well may have 
thought they were precluded from 
considering any mitigating evidence 
unless all twelve jurors agreed on the 
existence of a particular such cir-
cumstance. 
Id. at 1870. 
The Court therefore determined that the 
death sentence, which was upheld by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, must be 
vacated and the case remanded for 
resentencing. 
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, 
and Kennedy, concluded that the charges 
of the trial judge to the jury were reasona-
bly sufficient to emphasize the need for 
unanimity on all the issues involved, 
including the existence or nonexistence of 
mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, 
the dissent noted that the reworking of the 
verdict form was not evidence that the 
form itself was improper, since "a sentenc-
ing instruction that is constitutionally 
acceptable may be improved in any 
number of ways." Id. at 1874 n.2. 
A sentence of death places a heavy bur-
den on the court system to regulate the 
procedure by which it may be imposed. 
The decision of the Supreme Court in 
Mins illustrates not only the careful scruti-
ny that the imposistion of such sentence 
demands, but also the controversial ques-
tions that face the courts when protecting 
the constitutional rights of a person accus-
ed of a capital offense. 
-Gregory]. Swain 
McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin: 
NO-MERIT BRIEF PROVIDED TO 
TIlE COURT BY COURT 
APPOINTED APPELlATE 
COUNSEL DOES NOT VIOLATE 
INDIGENT'S SIXTH AND 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
In McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wiscon· 
sin, _U.S.-o 108 S. Ct. 1895 (1988), the 
United States Supreme Court held that 
Wisconsin's no-merit brief rule, by which 
court-appointed counsel must prepare for 
the court a statement of why particular 
cases, statutes, or facts in the record lead 
him to believe his client's appeal is without 
merit, is consitutional under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. In so holding, 
the Court indicates that counsel's role as 
an officer of the court is at least as impor-
tant, if not more important, than his role 
as an advocate and essentially places the 
attorney in the position of decision-maker. 
A Wisconsin trial judge found the appel-
lant, an indigent, guilty of abduction and 
sexual assault and sentenced him to twelve 
years in prison. Appellant then filed an 
appeal and the court appointed a lawyer to 
represent him. The attorney, after review-
ing the case, advised appellant that an 
appeal would be useless. Rule 809.32(1) of 
the Wisconsin Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure provides: 
H [a court-appointed attorney] is of the 
opinion that further appellate proceed-
ings on behalf of the defendant would 
be frivolous and without any arguable 
merit within the meaning of A nders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the 
attorney shall file with the court of 
appeals 3 copies of a brief in which is 
stated anything in the record that 
might arguably support the appeal and 
a discussion of why the issue lacks merit. 
(Emphasis added). 
Counsel partially complied with the rule 
by submitting arguments in support of the 
appeal, stating his belief that the argu-
ments were without merit, and asking for 
permission to withdraw from the case. 
Counsel failed, however, to provide the 
court with a discussion of why he believed 
those arguments were without merit, 
claiming such action would contravene 
Anders and violate the appellant's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. McCay at 
1898. Since the brief did not fully comply 
with Rule 809.32(1), the court ordered it 
stricken and told the attorney to submit a 
conforming brief. Instead, counsel sought 
a declaratory judgment in the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, asking the court to 
declare unconstitutional that portion of 
the rule which requires the attorney to dis-
cuss why the issue lacks merit. Id. at 1899. 
In upholding the rule, the Wisconsin court 
and the Supreme Court both relied on and 
expanded upon Anders. 
The petitioner in Anders was convicted 
of the felony of possession of marijuana. 
Counsel was appointed to represent him 
on appeal; however, after reviewing the 
record, the attorney advised his client and 
the court that the appeal was without 
merit. After petitioner's request for a new 
attorney was denied, he proceeded to rep-
resent himself on appeal, but his convic-
tion was affirmed. Six years later, 
petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in 
the Supreme Court of California, asking 
the courts to reopen his case because he 
had been denied the right to counsel on his 
appeal. Both petitions were denied. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, held 
that California's procedure, by which 
court-appointed counsel can withdraw 
from an appeal merely by furnishing the 
court with a letter in which counsel states 
that the appeal lacks merit, "does not com-
port with fair procedure and lacks that 
equality that is required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Anders at 741. Although 
the no-merit letter alerts the court of 
potentially frivolous litigation, it gives no 
basis for counsel's conclusion and fails to 
notify appellant of potential arguments in 
support of reversal. 
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As a result of the California procedure's 
shortcomings, the Court held that before 
permission to withdraw will be granted, 
counsel must prepare a brief "referring to 
anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal." Id. at 744. The proce-
dure the Court adopted was intended to 
"assure penniless defendants the same 
rights and opportunities on appeal - as 
nearly as is practicable - as are enjoyed by 
those persons who are in a similar situa-
tion but who are able to afford the reten-
tion of private counsel." Id. at 745. 
Anders was a logical progression from 
Gideon 'V. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
and Douglas 'V. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963), wherein the Court expanded the 
rights of indigents to effective representa-
tion. Gideon provided for the right of an 
indigent defendant in a state criminal trial 
to have the assistance of counsel. The 
Court held that the Sixth Amendment's 
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental right 
made obligatory upon the states by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon at 342. 
Similarly, Douglas provided for the right 
of an indigent defendant to counsel in a 
criminal appeal as of right. "Where the 
merits of the one and only appeal an indi-
gent has as of right are decided without 
benefit of counsel, ... an unconstitutional 
line has been drawn between rich and 
poor." Douglas at 357. 
A nders recognize counsel's conflicting 
responsibilities to his client and to the 
court. "His role as advocate requires that 
he support his client's appeal to the best of 
his ability. Of course, if counsel finds his 
case to be wholly frivolous, after a consci-
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advise the court and request permission to 
withdraw." Anders at 744. By requiring 
the attorney to file a brief outlining possi-
ble arguments for reversal at the same time 
that he opines that those arguments are 
without merit, the attorney satisfies both 
his duty to his client and his duty to the 
court. 
McCoy's arguments on appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court were two-fold. First, 
he argued that the rule violates the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection 
guarantee by discriminating against indi-
gents. Since only court-appointed counsel 
must petition the court for permission to 
withdraw from a case, it is only court-
appointed counsel who must file the no-
merit brief. In contrast, if retained counsel 
believes his client's appeal to be without 
merit, he simply tells his client that he will 
not represent him. A paying client, then, 
can continue to search for an attorney 
until he finds one who believes the appeal 
may succeed. 
Appellant'S second argument was that 
the rule violated his Sixth Amendment 
"right to effective representation by an 
advocate." McCoy at 1900. "The constitu-
tional requirement of substantial equality 
and fair process can only be attained where 
counsel acts in the role of an active advo-
cate in behalf of his client, as opposed to 
that of amicus curiae." Anders at 744. 
The McCoy Court went a step further 
than Anders by requiring counsel to dis-
cuss not only arguments which would sup-
port reversal but also why he believes 
those arguments to be without merit. The 
Supreme Court held that by requiring 
counsel to thoroughly review the record in 
preparation of the brief, "the discussion 
requirement provides an additional safe-
guard against mistaken conclusions by 
counsel that the stongest arguments he or 
she can find are frivolous." McCoy at 1904. 
Although the Supreme Court believed this 
requirement would serve the interests of 
the' client, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
described the requirement as a judicial aid: 
we view the rule as an attempt to pro-
vide the court with notice that there 
are facts on record or cases or statutes 
on point which would seem to compel 
a conclusion of no merit. McCoy 'V. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 137 
Wis.2d 90, 100, 403 N.W.2d 449, 454 
(1987). 
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in 
McCoy presents a cogent argument of why 
Wisconsin's discussion requirement would 
violate these constitutional guarantees. In 
Anders, he said: 
we held that a court may not permit 
appointed counsel to withdraw from a 
criminal appeal on the basis of the bald 
assertion that there is no merit to the 
appeal. Instead, appointed counsel's 
role as advocate requires that he sup-
port his client's appeal to the best of 
his ability and that any request to 
withdraw on the ground that the 
appeal is frivolous must be accompa-
nied by a brief referring to anything in 
the record that might arguably support 
the appeal. McCoy at 1906. 
Justice Brennan interpreted that to mean 
that an attorney is expected to argue in 
support of his client's appeal but not 
against it. "When counsel has nothing fur-
ther to say in his client's defense, he should 
say no more". Id. at 1907. If the attorney 
proceeds to argue against his client, which 
is what the discussion requirement forces 
him to do, he is no longer an advocate, but 
is, instead, a friend of the court. 
McCoy illustrates a willingness of the 
Court to limit the rights of an indigent on 
appeal when his attorney expresses the 
opinion that the indigent does not have a 
viable case. McCoy also attempts to curb 
litigation by prohibiting what is, in court-
appointed counsel's opinion, frivolous liti-
gation. 
This case goes a step further than Anders 
by sanctioning no-merit briefs. States that 
did not previously have a no-merit brief 
rule, believing such was unconstitutional 
and in violation of Anders, may not enact 
such a rule in an attempt to unclog their 
own courts. Finally, McCoy indicates a 
possibility that the Court will continue to 
limit an indigent's right to counsel on the 
theory that counsel is merely fulfilling his 
professional and ethical responsibilities by 
acting as an officer of the court rather than 
solely as an advocate. 
-Linda C Eddy 
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